We wrote this brief document when the government is about to complete one hundred days and presents its most important proposal: the new “fiscal policy framework”, thus completing the central orientation of its government and its economic policy. We have systematized some concepts and tasks to debate with the PSOL militancy and activism in face of this scenario.
The historic meaning of the October 2022 election victory
The electoral victory was narrow, but historic. Defeating Bolsonaro in the elections was a strategic victory because a second term of the extreme right could produce a qualitative change in the political relation of forces between the classes and consolidate a political regime that would be reactionary, to say the least. The democratic nature of Lula’s victory opened new possibilities for the struggle and brought us back from the abyss.
As we have analyzed, the victory occurred due to the conjunction of several factors in Lula’s favor: mass opposition to Bolsonaro from the most conscious sectors of the working class and middle sectors; the division of the bourgeoisie, with its most powerful sectors questioning Bolsonaro and a decisive part of them in opposition to the government, such as Globo and the Supreme Court; and the defeat of Trump in the US, reorienting the foreign policy of the imperialist power in a decisive action for the defeat of Bolsonaro in Brazil.
Despite the defeat at the polls, Bolsonarism has mass strength, has institutional weight, is well rooted in sectors of the bourgeoisie, the latifundia/agribusiness, the upper middle class and the security forces, counting on the sympathy of a few million in the working class. Hence the challenge to continue having as an axis the combat against the extreme right and the necessary caution so that the criticism and confrontations with the new government do not strengthen this sector. This scenario demands from us much greater ability and reserves than in 2003, when the PSOL began.
The position of independence was the adequate formula to not lose sight of the need for an alternative position, exactly when the current government assumes the positions derived from its nature as a bourgeois government, under penalty of the leftist banners being abandoned and the extreme right being consolidated among the workers, with vast sectors that must be disputed by the socialist left.
When we define it as a bourgeois government, we also define that it is not a “normal bourgeois government” because of its composition, strategy and program. With ministers that range from figures from social movements to representatives of business, agribusiness and even militia sectors, we define the Lula-Alckmin formula within this concept.
January 8th in the context of the political situation
The government began with a popular inauguration of enormous symbolic force. Beforehand, it appointed the obvious ministry to embody the character of government described above. A few days later, on January 8, Bolsonarism did its national version of the invasion of the US Capitol. It was an unprepared action in the form of a coup plot.
Such action resulted in a profound defeat for the far right. Impressionist and frightened sectors of the left again predicted that Bolsonarism had proven its strength and capability by rehearsing a new offensive. But reality demonstrated the opposite, as the unpreparedness was complete, indicating a basic error in the analysis of the relation of forces and leading to the strengthening of the new government. Lula acted quickly and forcefully, allowing greater cohesion around his administration, widening the steps for the expansion of support upstairs, in a “national unity of all without Bolsonaro”. In addition, the “no amnesty” agenda was strengthened, turning the possibility of Bolsonaro’s arrest into something sensible and making his ineligibility probable.
Still under the impulse of this action, Lula and the government were proactive in the Yanomami genocide crisis, confronting the calamitous situation and attacking part of the base of the miners’ and loggers’ militias that operate in the region with political cover from Bolsonaro. There have been hundreds of coup plotters arrested in Brasilia’s prisons, among them one of the planners of the coup attempt, Anderson Torres.
Bolsonaro’s weakening has not been accompanied by a relentless struggle on the part of the government. Ibaneis became governor again, after the period of judicial impediment and José Múcio, despite the demands of important progressive sectors, continued as minister in the key post of the relationship with the Armed Forces.
Bolsonaro returned to the country, haunted by new accusations of corruption and illicit enrichment in the case of jewelry, a smuggling of assets worth millions of reais. Despite this, Bolsonaro seeks to maintain his prestige and initiative, even in the face of fissures in his own base of support.
However, on completing 100 days, the break given by the adventurous action of Bolsonarism no longer has the strength to reduce the contradictions of the government.
The pressure for adjustment and the new “fiscal policy framework”
The bourgeois pressure came with full force, centered on the demand for fiscal adjustment, now called “fiscal package”. The form of the pressure was diverse: through the media and, above all, through the practical action of the Central Bank, maintaining the highest interest rates in the world. For a period Lula resisted in discourse, following Bolsonaro’s well-executed example of transmitting ideas according to the will of his social base, but allowing the government to do the opposite. As seen in Bolsonaro’s experience, this pattern of performance can be maintained for a while, but not forever. Soon, Lula’s speech, early on by the way, became more in line with practice. Then came the much-demanded new fiscal rule that pleases the bourgeoisie. The new plan pleased the market because it foresees that the country will save part of an eventual increase in revenue to pay the public debt. However, the biggest creditors of this debt are precisely the richest people and the banks. These are the owners of the market, and giving them security was the main goal of the rule, showing them that they will receive every penny. But this debt is illegitimate, it should be audited and part of its payment should be suspended immediately. We can use as an illustration the recent interview of Gabriel Galípolo, number two at the Treasury, in which he indicates the path adopted by the government:
“One thing is the rule, another thing are the parameters. The idea of being audacious but credible is very much associated with the parameters. You need to demonstrate to the market and to society your commitment to pursuing the fiscal result, which will allow for a better behaved trajectory of the debt/GDP ratio, but simultaneously not pass on a ratio that will at every moment have a regime that works by exception, as we have seen”.
This is a complex debate and the center of the bourgeois pressure is to make the government adopt the fiscal surplus line. The term is technical, but the objective is clear: to guarantee resources to pay the debt. The adjustment is strong, of 3% of the GDP until the end of the mandate. It is a commitment of a bourgeois government. What the country needs are investments in public education, in health and in public works to build popular housing to guarantee employment and housing. Otherwise, it is the extreme right that may become stronger in the future again.
Here we have the excellent analysis of the Citizen Debt Audit, showing, by the way, that the government even ended with the spending cap, only increasing between 0.6 and 2.5% of the previous expenditure (following the increase in revenue by up to 70% at most) added to inflation:
“According to the presentation of the new fiscal package made by the government, we will continue to have a ceiling for primary spending and, additionally, a ceiling for its growth!
As stated in the screen [presented by the government], ‘the current spending cap is now banded with real growth of primary expenditure between 0.6% to 2.5% p.a.’.
This means that we will continue to have ceilings for social spending and state structure. The difference is that this ceiling will be calculated in a more flexible way, within a “band” that will vary between 0.6% and 2.5% above the previous year’s primary expenditure updated by the IPCA.
For example, if the primary expense in a certain year was R$ 1 trillion, in the following year it cannot exceed the maximum ceiling of R$ 1 trillion + IPCA + 2.5% (R$ 25 billion), according to the new fiscal package, being guaranteed a minimum ceiling of R$ 1 trillion + IPCA + 0.6% (R$ 6 billion). In the EC-95 calculation for this example, the ceiling would be fixed at R$ 1 trillion + IPCA.”
Bolsonaro had already “drilled” the spending cap in practice, as a way to materialize some of his election promises over the year 2022. The proposed framework guarantees the surplus, meaning that the increase in government spending cannot reach more than 2.5% above inflation, nor 70% of any increase in revenue. For maintaining the neoliberal viewpoint, some critical economists have defined the formula as a “spending band ceiling”. All this to continue paying the public debt, remunerating the rentiers. The note from the Brazilian Federation of Banks (FEBRABAN) leaves no doubt:
“This is an important and meritorious step, as it seeks to combine the country’s social priorities with the necessary control of the expansion of public spending. Although it is necessary to know and go into more detail, the announced proposal represents an advance in the search for a sustainable trajectory for the public debt, by establishing limits for the expansion of public sector expenses combined with ambitious primary result targets, with the forecast of zero primary deficit as early as 2024”.
The dynamics of struggles and contradictions
The first hundred days were not marked by any great national struggle by the working class, but there is an important space for politicization in society. We bet and want to develop this space. Surveys indicate support rates for Lula of around 50%, however, when we discuss the support for the fall in interest rates, this figure jumps to 80%, demonstrating broad popular support for the struggle against rentierism.
On the other hand, as already mentioned, the relation of forces is still of an unstable balance and the presence of the extreme right. The far right’s parliamentary action has a significant impact on the social networks; the governors aligned with Bolsonarism are still in a waiting period, with uneven results in their first 100 days.
There have been some land occupations by the MST in Bahia, and rural and urban occupations promoted by the FNL, as well as the national commotion generated by the slave labor scandal in the Rio Grande do Sul wineries. The PSOL of Rio Grande do Sul, as a matter of fact, was at the forefront of the denunciation and the request for the arrest of the Bolsonaro councilman Sandro Fantinel, as well as of the important articulation of jurists linked to Labor Law, who insist on the resumption of the law that provides for the expropriation of land from the agents who use labor force analogous to slavery.
After demonstrations throughout the month of March, a dispute that involved the most leftist and critical sectors in the education movement – students, civil servants, and teachers – reaps its first positive results. Important struggles were strengthened, such as the suspension of the high school reform, and even partial struggles had important results, such as the strikes of the civil service and the São Paulo subway strike that twisted the arm of governor Tarcísio de Freitas.
Another drama that affects schools involves hate networks linked to the extreme right, expressed violently in the attacks against schools, day care centers and other similar spaces that victimized teachers, students and children, shocking the country. The latest episode was the massacre of children in a daycare center in Blumenau.
Another issue is the fight against Bolsonaro’s crimes: a manifesto, signed by figures like Vladimir Safatle, Christian Dunker and the Mothers of May, among others, has already collected hundreds of thousands of signatures and there was an important demonstration on April 1st – marking the date of the 1964 coup – at USP’s Law School.
The PSOL in the face of the “fiscal policy framework”
Now there will be a moment of political struggle for the PSOL. The sectors of the party that support this rule will accept the national pact for maintaining bourgeois economic policy, a kind of more moderate neoliberalism, at most with larger compensatory social measures and some more competent plan for investments in green industry. A less savage neo-liberalism, without the disqualified surrenderism, but at the end of the day neo-liberalism, because of the defense of austerity and the debt system. Interest rates may come down a bit, but it is clear that it will be a very slow reduction. The visible outlook is that the country will not have noteworthy growth. The tendency, therefore, is the continuation of wage austerity, structural unemployment, and the precariousness of public services.
Fortunately, there is a possibility of improvement in the country and in the situation of the working class if we compare them to Bolsonaro’s 4 years. The reduction of the privatization program, the qualification of public agents in universities and healthcare, the greater sensitivity of the government parties, which did not exist in the Bolsonaro government, may allow some improvement. But the general trend does not indicate substantial improvement capable of making the government develop great popular support. The trend is one of attrition. The government decided to lean on the bourgeoisie, especially in partnership with Globo, but also with the big capitalists, and to bet on the immobility of the unions, operating with the just and evident fear of the return of Bolsonaro.
Some voices are already acting against the critical adherence of the PSOL to this true “neoliberal consensus,” such as the economist of the PSOL caucus, David Deccache:
“A concrete example of the impact of the new fiscal rule is to think about what would happen if it were in force in Lula 2 Government, during the 2008 crisis. In 2009, we had a negative net revenue variation of 0.14%. With only the 70% correction rule there would be no real expansion in 2010. Then would come the 0.6% floor, which would guarantee a real growth totally insufficient and detached from reality and that many celebrate as an advance of the new rule. A mistake. Let me explain.
Concretely, Lula made a real expansion of 16.29%. If Haddad’s rule were in effect, it would be only 0.6%.
What do you think would happen to the country at that moment? Instead of employment and income expansion with the highest GDP growth in decades, we would have a huge economic slowdown and deep crisis.
Deccache’s courageous position helps us to provoke the debate among activism about the directions of the economy, of which the PSOL must take part.
The economic scenario is worrisome
The adjustment contained in the economic proposal sent under the name of “fiscal policy package” is part of a gloomy scenario. Unlike the 2000s, when the government benefited from a cycle of commodity boom in a global economy where China was the pole of expansion, the picture today is different, if not opposite.
A series of elements of the international conjuncture are open: the consequences of the crisis of financial capital that hit the banks SVB and Credit Suisse, the debt time bomb in numerous countries, the tension between China and the USA, the hypothesis of new bankruptcy in neighboring Argentina, and the continuation of the war motivated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Besides this, two immediate problems threaten the economy: the new hike in fuel prices foreseen with the tax reductions and the new international oil prices, and the increase in inflation/cost of living. The government must immediately break with the policy of International Price Index (IPI) or risk bankruptcy.
Our politics
Our policy must have as its axis the fight against the extreme right, without losing the defense of workers’ rights. We maintain the view that the PSOL must be the engine of the line of organizing the struggle in all spheres against the extreme right, without losing its independence. Our location, in society and in parliament, as an “organizer” of demands, will be key for the construction of a critical pole, capable of building a real alternative, anti-capitalist and with mass influence.
Thus we highlight the following slogans:
(a) Against the extreme right, de-Bolsonize Brazil! It is necessary to take advantage of the defensive moment of the extreme right to attack it at its critical points, exposing the links between attacks on schools, hate attacks, misogynist movements, and similar with this ideological strand. In the same way, the strong action against slave labor and child labor, issues systematically relativized by Bolsonarist congressmen, must face a fight without truce or amnesty for those responsible.
(b) The defense of the banners of the working class, support for its struggles and the rejection of the fiscal rule, the adjustment of Haddad and the bankers. From this position, we will develop our line of defense of the audit of the public debt, its non-payment, and the reduction of interest rates – returning to the terms of the 1988 Constitution, which foresaw rates above 12% as a crime. In addition, we must center our agitation for the taxation of large fortunes, corporate profits and dividends, and luxury goods, demonstrating to the people the need to make the rich pay for the crisis.
(c) To indicate the centrality of socio-environmental demands in the face of the climate crisis. For this, it is essential to fight for an urban reform that acts against the interests of the big real estate markets, as well as the concrete confrontation of environmental racism that affects the most vulnerable oppressed sectors of the working class, besides the creation of a special fund against climate disasters. In this sense, the strengthening of policies in defense of native peoples, the fight against predatory extractivism and mining in the Amazon, the fight against new dams and infrastructure works that degrade the environment, among other examples, should be at the center of an action plan built with the protagonism of social movements and organizations of the directly affected populations.