Chile: An initial reading of the extreme right’s victory in the elections

A reflection on the major defeat suffered by the left in the recent Chilean constitutional elections and the role of the Boric administration in this process

Photo: Natalia Espina / CNCA

We started a very initial reading, aimed at the Brazilian public, about the election that took place on Sunday in Chile. The result aroused interest and a certain surprise, both in the press and in activist circles. After all, how did Chile go from being a vector of hope to a huge victory of the extreme right in such a short period of time?

The boulevards seized by enthusiasm, in the October 2019 uprising, when hundreds of thousands put against the ropes not only Piñera’s conservative government, but also the order in place for the last 30 years, seem far removed from the Chile of last Sunday, May 7, when the Republican Party, nostalgic for pinochetism, won by a wide margin the electoral process for the choice of Constitutional Council that will give final shape to the country’s new magna carta.

Let’s go to the numbers: 50 elected councilors were chosen, through the parties, who added to the representative of the indigenous peoples, make up the 51 seats of the Constitutional Council. The Republican Party, led by the neo-fascist Kast, got 35.48% of the votes (22 councilors); far behind was the coalition “Unity for Chile”, summing up the forces of the “I Approve Dignity” grouping (Broad Front, Communist Party, Democratic Revolution, Commons, among others) with the Socialist Party, with 27.45% of the votes (17 councilors); finally, the traditional right wing, called “Secure Chile” (UDI, RN and Evopoli), obtained 21.14% of the votes (11 councilors).

Excluded from the Council, for not reaching the minimum threshold, were “Todos por Chile” (All for Chile), made up of the Christian Democracy and the forces that were part of the former “Concertación”, with the exception of the PS; and the liberal party, “Partido de la Gente”, with approximately 9 and 5%, respectively.

Another relevant fact was the very high number, more than two million, of null votes. If we add the blank ballots, we get a figure that exceeds 20%, around 2.5 million votes.

This was the Boric government’s second major defeat. The first was the plebiscite to approve the new constituent was marked by the “Refusal” of the government’s proposal. The result, capitalized on by the right and extreme right, was 62% for “I reject” against 38% for “I approve,” in a clear sign that the government was wearing down.

So we had the following cycle: a) the uprising of October 2019, opening a new social and political path; b) the plebiscite voted with 80% for a new constitution, on October 25, 2020; c) the election of constituent representatives, in May 2021, with a wide victory for the left, with citizen and independent presence; d) the very close election of Boric over Kast, in a second round, in December 2021; e) the victory of the ” Rechaço” in September 2022; f) the resounding triumph of Kast and the Republican Party in the last May 7th election.

In other words, the Boric government is a distorted – and mediated – expression of the process that began with the youth struggles more than a decade ago and had its culmination in the October 2019 uprising. And this expression is the fruit of a high political polarization that lives and has lived in society since then, with Kast being the reverse, with a clearly counter-revolutionary program. We define Boric as a distorted expression, precisely because of the sense that his conciliatory action has primed already in the agreement that ended the 2019 mobilization, in the so-called “kitchen pact”.

How to read turning to the right of a sector of the electorate? How to understand the dynamics and more than that, how to act?

We go back to an interesting explanation by Pedro Fuentes and Bruno Magalhães, at the time of the defeat in September 2022:

The proposal for a new Constitution was born then in the “Pact of the Kitchen,” as the agreement made behind the backs of the masses mobilized in the popular councils (cabildos) organized throughout the country became known (…)

Since the formation of his government until the present, his policy has been one of conciliation with the ruling classes, without confronting them with concrete measures (which would have to be radical) to solve the problems that Chile is going through. The government was wearing down amidst an inflation rate of 13% and an increase in the cost of the basic food basket that disregards the value of salaries. As a result, its current approval rating is less than 30%.

Consequently, his policy toward the new Constitution was contradictory, vacillating, and his support was timid. Consistent with his policy of conciliation, he expressed his reservations and, together with the leaders of the old Concertación, raised the need for changes to be made to its regulations.

There are additional elements, such as the general crisis of living conditions, that involve a greater rejection of the Boric government (in March 2023, it was only 35%). As an offshoot of the economic and social crisis, urban violence is growing, with the hard right building agitation for more repression and blaming the explosion of immigration-especially of Venezuelans-for social insecurity.

Boric responds with political impotence, giving in to the more conservative agenda and distancing himself from the bases that elected him. He has responded with more criminalization like the “easy trigger” law and all militarization of the southern border, historical territory of the Mapuche people.

So there is a new reality. The victory of the extreme right will be accompanied by a rescue of the Pinochetist tradition and Kast’s need to change the social correlation of forces, impose a historic defeat and solve the “impasse” of the regime with an authoritarian government.

It is worth thinking about the flood of null votes that also represent a generic malaise against the government, but not a blank check for the neo-fascists to act.

The extreme right was disadvantaged in the plebiscite and in the constituent, but through Kast, it systematically organized the reactionary sectors and factions, which always appear strongly when there are pre-revolutionary or revolutionary situations. On the contrary, no organization or political tool appeared that was the direct expression of the mobilized people in the streets, in the councils, and later in the constituent. With the majority, the popular organization was unable to forge a unitary tool. In its demands, the movement for the new constituent placed more emphasis on democratic demands (which were necessary) and less on class demands, as sectors like Cristian Cuevas’ MVP insisted to us. When we talk about class demands, we are talking not only about the organized workers’ movement, like the battle for the public pension, but for broad layers of the people, as in the case of the regulation of popular housing.

A broad and unitary tool should come together not for the finished program, but a program for immediate action, for struggle.

A unitary political tool that would privilege not a finished program, but an action program of struggle. There is time and need to build it, having as its center the struggle against the new pinochetism of Kast.

The first task of the popular and social forces is to put a stop to the extreme right, but they need to come out of the defensive, presenting a project capable of dialoguing with broad sectors, mobilizing the bases, especially the youth, faithful to the October program, and regaining the enthusiasm for change.

In Colombia, President Gustavo Petro is relying on mobilizations to prevent the large corporations from blocking society and parliament, in order to build a reform in favor of public health.

Petro’s example and the reservations that the social left and popular movements have in Chile, whether the sectors that were part of the “People’s List”, the militant social, feminist, territorial, indigenous movements, or sectors of the parties that today support Boric, can serve as a point of support for an inflection to popular mobilization.

The winding path of the Chilean process imposes the urgency of a debate in the Latin American left as a whole. To take up again the October agenda, in all its potency and radicality, is the way forward, betting on “stepping onto the streets again” and on the “liberated plazas”, from the Santiago of Pablo Milanes’ song.

Leia também

Mais em Notícia